The limitations and dangers of Western government funding and promotion of Islam in the context of the new 'war of ideas' by ROY, Olivier
BR
IE
F
PO
LI
CY
The limitations and dangers of 
Western government funding 
and promotion of Islam in 
the context of the new ‘war of 
ideas’
Olivier Roy
Issue 2016/04 
December 2016
A widely shared view in Europe is that fighting radicalization and 
terrorism supposes the promotion of a “good moderate Islam”. This 
view is based more on unchecked prerequisites (the more religious you 
are, the more prone to radicalization) and wishful thinking (reform 
the theology and you will get “moderate” believers). Nevertheless 
there is something that can be done and be efficient in the long term: 
developing spaces where Muslims and specifically imams can develop 
a theological reflection in a European intellectual framework.
A wrong answer to real problems
There are two issues: jihadism (including terrorism) and Salafism 
(a fundamentalist reading of the Koran and the hadith). Salafism is 
essentially perceived as the matrix of jihadism, which is wrong. 
1) Terrorists and jihadists are more often disenfranchised youth in 
quest of a cause who cast their revolt into the Islamic narrative of Al 
Qaeda and Daesh (hence the astonishing and growing number of 
converts, not to speak of petty delinquents, both of them having no 
previous theological training in Islam). They are believers once they 
join the fight; religion is relevant in the framing of their revolt, but the 
revolt is not a consequence of years of religious training.
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2) Most salafis, by contrast, don’t push for jihad, but preach 
a sort of social and cultural “secession”: good Muslims 
should abstain to mingle with either non-Muslims or 
“bad” Muslims. This attitude creates a lot of societal 
problems in European societies (gender segregation, 
rejection of common social rules, ghettoïsation of 
destitute neighbourhoods etc.), and fuels hostility from 
the rest of the population. They claim also to represent 
the only “true” Islam and struggle to strip of religious 
legitimacy any other moderate religious voices. We may 
add that they also reject multi-culturalism because they 
consider that religion has nothing to do with culture: they 
reject the very concept of a “muslim culture”.
Confusing both jihadism and salafism would 1) miss 
the real roots of radicalization, 2) miss the causes of the 
success of Salafism.
But in both cases, there is a common issue: the lack 
of Islamic religious alternative in our societies. The 
“other” Muslim believers have little visibility and few 
credible representatives (imams, theologians, religious 
intellectuals). Jihad and Salafism offer a (different) answer 
to a quest of spirituality, not to speak to a quest of the 
“absolute” (culminating in the suicide bombing).
A purely secular approach (teaching values, tolerance, 
“laïcité”, or chasing Islamic signs from the public sphere) 
will not answer this religious demand.
The issue here is not to “empty” the religious field , but 
on the contrary to “saturate” and  diversify it, by trying to 
offer different forms of religious practices.
This is often framed by European institutions as 
“promoting moderate Islam”, but this not the right 
approach. The issue is how to root a Muslim religious 
practice in a European context.
The limitations of institutional action to 
promote “moderate Islam”
1) The notion of “moderate religion” makes little sense: 
Martin Luther and Jean Calvin were not moderate 
theologians. Each revealed monotheistic religion 
contends that God’s law is above man’s law (a claim made 
by Pope Francis as well).
The issue is not theology per se but how a set of beliefs is 
put into practice by the believers, -what I call “religiosity”, 
that is the way a believer experiences and acts his or her 
own religion. The problem is that in a secular Europe we 
tend to consider that a moderate believer is somebody 
who believes moderately, an assertion that true believers 
cannot accept, whatever their religion and whatever their 
own way to comply with man’s law. Religion is religion: 
looking for “soft” religion is a non-starter.
2) A secular state cannot interfere with theology. It may 
and should regulate the behaviour of all citizens in the 
public sphere, and prevent abuses even in the private 
sphere. It may thus regulate religious practices, but not 
ask for a theological change. A European citizen has the 
right to stick to conservative values, to be “pro-life’, to 
oppose same-sex marriage and not to be Charlie. This is 
the basic definition of freedom of religion (and opinion). 
3) Tensions between dominant values and specific 
religious practices should be dealt with as a conflict 
of rights, not as an ideological or cultural fight against 
“obscurantism”.  Among recent conflicts of rights, we 
can mention “child’s rights” (circumcision) and “animal’s 
rights” (ritual slaughtering). It is up to the courts, and in 
last instance, the EC of HRs to deal with such conflicts 
of rights. Incidentally any endeavour to “curb” Islamic 
religious practices has an impact on religion in general 
(banning the veil entails the banning of the yarmulke, 
forbidding halal entails forbidding kasher, restricting 
religion to the private would precisely contribute to the 
de-christianization of Europe).
4) Informal campaigns to promote a “good moderate 
Islam”, by giving the floor to Muslim liberal intellectuals 
who often are not believers themselves, miss their targets. 
They bypass believers and theologians, who should be the 
first actors in dealing with radicalisation.
Nevertheless there is a need and a 
possibility for a proactive policy 
Any policy towards Islam should be based on two 
principles: 1) let religion to the religious, 2) regulate the 
religious market by encouraging those who accept an 
“embedded” Islam in Europe.
The interlocutors should be religious actors. If we want a 
“European” Islam, it is counter-productive to treat Islam 
as a “culture”, foreign by definition. Moreover “true” 
believers want religion, not a cultural ersatz. The key issue 
is hence about the Imams and theologians.
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The need to have a better religious apparatus for European 
Muslims is obvious.
1) First of all too many imams are foreign educated, 
don’t master the basic European codes and cultures, are 
unable to foster integration, and sometimes just reject it. 
Secondly, they propagate too often a very conservative 
version of Islam, not to speak of Salafism. Thirdly they 
are less and less in touch with the growing middle classes 
of Muslim origin, whose rise is overlooked by political 
actors and by the media. These new middle classes are the 
actors of the change, because they have specific religious 
needs (to be believers, citizens and economic actors in the 
same time). The problem is that educated young Muslims 
don’t want to become imam: no prestige, not well paid, 
dependent from local Islamic associations in the hands 
of notables. There is a crisis of vocation among educated 
second and third generation of Muslims which explains 
why imams are still “imported” from the south (the same 
phenomena exists in the catholic Church, except that the 
African priests appointed in Europe have a good previous 
training in church seminaries).
2) The training of Imams should not be delegated to 
foreign states (official agreements with Turkey and 
Morocco, informal agreements with Egypt, grants from 
Saudi Arabia). Firstly foreign countries, even when 
they are our allies, consider Muslims in Europe as their 
diaspora that should not assimilate, and not as full 
European citizens; secondly the Islam they promote is 
usually very conservative and not open to theological 
debate. Free debate is not on the agenda of the foreign 
sponsors. It should be on our agenda. Once again the idea 
is not to impose a “moderate” Islam, but to establish an 
arena of free debates on religion. Freedom of debate is the 
pre-requisite for any theological reformation from inside 
3) Imams should be trained in a European religious 
context. The issue as we said is not theology (inter-faith 
dialogue does not really help here), but religiosity: how 
to be a believer in a European secular context. Informal 
interaction is more important than huge conferences. The 
idea is to shape a common approach to faith in a secular 
context, not a common theology of course. 
Training places should not be insulated, but on the 
contrary in close proximity with other religions. 
The problem of course is that the states cannot organize 
such interaction. But they could encourage it in the 
framework of the existing legislations. Given the diversity 
of such legislation, the answer could only be at a European 
level and in a very flexible way:
• Making use of existing academic theological faculties 
to open Islamic theological faculties in a religious 
academic context. This supposes a strong cooperation 
of the Christian Churches (not always very open to 
the idea).
• Supporting the only existing autonomous Islamic 
European faculty of theology: the Sarajevo faculty 
of Islamic theology, established by the Austro-
hungarian empire. It has a remarkable academic 
staff, but is surrounded by religious establishments 
lavishly funded by foreign states. It has credibility, 
whether academic, religious or even political (the 
single presence of the vast graveyard resulting from 
the war would deter any western jihadi to play the 
“holier than thou” story).
• The idea would be to connect different institutions 
(not excluding foreign ones) that could provide 
a formation that would be “homologated” at a 
European level.
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